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ABSTRACT
In 2010, the Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation (OLG) – the Crown
Corporation of the Government of Ontario (Canada) charged with regulating
and administering lotteries, casinos, and race tracks in Ontario – announced
its plans to launch an online gaming website.  This article explores the Prov-
ince of Ontario’s foray into online gaming, weighing the likely success of that
venture against the regulatory approaches taken in jurisdictions like the United
Kingdom (U.K.) and United States of America.  Some “modest proposals” are
also suggested.***
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 10, 2010, the Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation (OLG)
announced its plans to create an online gaming website.1  The actual planning
and implementation of the website will take eighteen months.2  This develop-
ment follows British Columbia’s lead in becoming the first province or state in
North America to offer legalized online casino gambling.3
Despite the considerable debate over online gaming in the past few years,4
it seems that provincial governments have finally decided their path, opting to
control and regulate their own online gaming sites.  However, online gaming is
* Emir Aly Crowne is an Associate Professor at the University of Windsor, Faculty of Law,
and a Barrister & Solicitor with the Law Society of Upper Canada.
** Anthony Andreopoulos is an Articling Student with Lofranco Chagpar Corriero LLC.
*** The unseen and thorough efforts of the UNLV Gaming Law Journal’s editorial staff is
gratefully acknowledged, as is the exceptional editorial assistance of Luciana Tancoc-Marcu
and the on-going funding provided by the Law Foundation of Ontario.
1 OLG to Launch Internet Gaming, ONTARIO LOTTERY & GAMING CORP. (Aug. 10, 2010),
http://media.olg.ca/?p=nmm_news_detail&i=dcc00afc-58bf-4380-bc8f-9284e2a4946a.
2 Id.
3 Rob Ferguson, Legal Online Gambling in the Cards for Ontario?; ‘It’s Something We
Can’t Ignore,’ Says an Official for Government Burdened with Huge Deficit, THE TORONTO
STAR, Aug. 7, 2010, at A1.
4 See generally, Justin Rex & David J. Jackson, The Options for Internet Gambling in
Canada, 1 ACSUS OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON PUB. POL’Y SERIES, no. 3, at 1, 1, http://www.
acsus.org/public/pdfs/OP_v1n3.pdf.
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borderless: it is already accessible by residents of Canadian provinces.  There-
fore, other than being “too late,” a governmental strategy that does not address
the borderless nature of online gaming will see its revenues lost to sites cur-
rently unregulated by Canadian governments (yet, still readily accessible to its
residents), thereby placing sensitive personal and financial information at the
whims of offshore entities and jurisdictions.5
This paper will provide a brief history of Canadian gambling laws and
suggest reasons why Canada’s current strategy of online gaming regulation is
deficient.  The authors will then analyze the strategies of the United Kingdom
and the United States, as they are the two jurisdictions most likely to influence
Canadian policy makers.  Analysis of the historical development of gaming in
Canada and various international strategies for dealing with online gaming
leads to the conclusion that Canada’s strategy should include a more compre-
hensive approach: one that includes the regulation of foreign-operated gaming
sites.
II. HISTORY
A. Overview
Canadian gambling law derives from early English laws, which were
incorporated into Canada through Confederation in 1867.6  In 1892, the Crimi-
nal Code set out a complete ban on all gambling activities.7  Over time, how-
ever, the ban was gradually lifted through amendments to the Criminal Code.8
Initially, gambling became legalized only through exemptions to the Criminal
Code that permitted small scale gambling for charities,9 but in 1969 things
turned around.10  Amendments to the Criminal Code produced a shift in juris-
diction between the federal and provincial levels of government permitting both
levels of government to regulate gambling activities.11  With the 1969 amend-
ments, provincial governments were, for instance, able to hold lotteries for
charitable or religious causes.12  Gradually, administrative regulation of gam-
bling replaced criminal law provisions, and by the mid-1970s every province
and territory in Canada had its own lottery system.13  The shift in jurisdiction
between the federal and provincial levels of government with respect to gam-
5 In an earlier paper, one of the authors along with Roberto Andreacchi already posited that
there are probably no common law remedies available to victims of online gambling fraud,
see Emir Aly Crowne-Mohammed & Roberto Andreacchi, The (Un)availability of Common
Law Remedies for Victims of Online Gambling Fraud, 13 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 304,
309 (2009).
6 Rhys Stevens, Legal Gaming in Canada, CENTRE FOR GAMING RES., http://gaming.unlv.
edu/subject/canadajurisdicion.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Colin S. Campbell et al., The Legalization of Gambling in Canada, THE LAW COMMIS-
SION OF CAN., 15 (2005).
11 Michael Y. Seelig & Julie H. Seelig, “Place Your Bets!” On Gambling, Government and
Society, 24 CAN. PUB. POL’Y ANALYSE DE POLITIQUES 91, 93 (1998).
12 Id.
13 Id.
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bling was finally completed in 1985, when the federal government left gam-
bling entirely to the provinces in exchange for a payment of $100 million
dollars (payable over a three-year period), which would be redirected to the
1988 Calgary Olympics, and $24 million paid annually (adjusted according to
the Consumer Price Index).14
Today, section 207(1) of the Criminal Code15 makes it lawful for the gov-
ernment of a province, either alone or in concert with another province, to
conduct and manage a lottery scheme in accordance with the laws of the
respective province.16  Moreover, section 207 allows charitable or religious
organizations and exhibitions to conduct lottery schemes as long as the Lieu-
tenant Governor in Council has issued them a license in their respective prov-
ince, or by a person specified by the Lieutenant.17  In other words, in order for
a Canadian gaming operation to be legal, it has to be permitted by a provincial
government.
B. Online Gaming
On October 1, 2008, Bill C-13, an Act to amend the Criminal Code, came
into effect.18  Among other things, the act amended subsection 202(1)(i) of the
Criminal Code.  Originally, the subsection prohibited placing bets using ‘tele-
phone, radio, and telegraph.’  The act substituted those older modes of commu-
nication with the more generalized language of “any message that conveys any
information.”19
At first blush, this amendment seemed like a simple attempt to update or
modernize the Criminal Code, one that replaced an exhaustive list of modes of
communication with the word “any,” as to include all modern and future
advances in communication technology.  However, this section began to attract
a great deal more attention when Senator Baker explained that this amendment
would include the Internet as a mode of communication.20  A week later, on
November 28, 2007, Hal Pruden, a senior official at the Department of Justice,
explained to the Senate committee that the intent of the language was to mod-
ernize the means of communication, and the offense was the same one that
existed (at that time) in subsection 202(1)(i).21
A day later, on November 29, 2007, Brahm Gelfand, a member of the
International Advisory Committee for PartyGaming PLC, addressed the Senate
committee and asked whether the amendment was supposed to affect only
those who are in Canada, or if it was supposed to affect a company such as
PartyGaming PLC, which carries on business offshore (and is regulated and
14 Colin S. Campbell et al., supra note 10, at 16-17 (citing MICHAEL LABROSSE, THE LOT-
TERY: FROM JACQUES CARTIER’S DAY TO MODERN TIMES (Stance 1985); See also, Emir Aly
Crowne-Mohammed & Sanjay Roy, Maintaining Provincial Monopolies: The Legality of
Online Gambling Sites in Canada, CANADIAN GAMING LAW. MAG., May 2010 at 8.
15 Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 207.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Bill C-13, S.C. 2008, c. 18 (Can.).
19 Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 202(i).
20 144 DEB. OF THE S. 266, 276-77 (Nov. 21, 2007) (statement of Sen. Baker).
21 Proceedings of the Standing S. Comm. on Legal & Const. Aff., 39th Parl, 14 (2007)
(statement of Counsel Pruden).
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licensed outside of Canada).22  Senator Oliver responded by saying that “this
bill was not designed and drafted to impinge upon the sovereign rights of
another state,” and as such, he felt that no further clarification was needed
because the law was clear.23  Senator Oliver explained that the bill was trying
to address the fact that Canadians utilize different modes of communication,
and the amendments were needed to keep pace with evolving telecommunica-
tion practices.24  The Senator stressed that the amendments had nothing to do
with extraterritoriality.25
Indeed, the Senate’s intent can be gleaned from the Fourth Report from
December 11, 2007, which stated:
One final observation concerns the fear expressed by a [Senate committee] witness of
the potential extra-territorial application of clause 5 of the bill, which deals with the
transmission and reception of information relating to book-making, betting and
wagering, among other things [sic]. For the sake of clarity, the Committee wishes to
note that it is satisfied that clause 5 of the bill will not have extraterritorial
application.26
Senator Joan Fraser reiterated this position on December 12, 2007, when
she stated that the senators tried to allay the concerns that were raised during
the Senate committee regarding the possible extraterritorial application of
clause 5 of the bill.27  Fraser appeared satisfied upon assurances by Senator
Oliver and the minister that extraterritorial application was not the concern or
effect of this bill.28  Bill C-13 was given its Third Reading on January 29, 2008
and was then returned to the House of Commons.29
On February 6, 2008, the Hon. Roy Cullen, from Etobicoke North, ques-
tioned the enforceability of Bill C-13, arguing that the:
[L]aw should be practical, relevant, enforceable and generally have the support of the
people. In some cases the latter criteria cannot always be met. Sometimes govern-
ments have to take some action that citizens generally would not appreciate. How-
ever, generally laws to be effective need to be feasible, operable and enforceable and
enforced, otherwise people lose their respect and confidence in the Criminal Code.30
According to Cullen, both he and the Woodbine Entertainment Group
(“WEG”) had become quite frustrated with the growth in illegal Internet bet-
ting, which essentially takes market share away from WEG’s casinos and race-
tracks in Ontario.31  However, the amendments have little to do with Cullen’s
concerns around Internet betting, especially because the bill was intended to
have no extraterritorial application and would therefore be impotent against
non-Canadian gaming sites. Indeed, it seems as though Mitchell Garber, the
22 Id. at 67-68 (statement of Member Gelfand).
23 Id. at 70 (statement of Sen. Oliver).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 THE STANDING S. COMM. ON LEGAL & CONST. AFF., FOURTH REP. (Dec. 11, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/392/lega/rep/rep04dec07-e.htm.
27 144 Deb. of the S., 469, 518-20 (Dec. 12, 2007) (statement of Sen. Fraser).
28 Id.
29 142 H. of Commons Deb. 469, 506 (Oct. 29, 2007).
30 142 H. of Commons Deb. 2653, 2683 (Feb. 6, 2008) (statement of Sen. Cullen).
31 Id.
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CEO of PartyGaming PLC, was right to recommend that the words, “in
Canada,” be added to the amendment.
After being sent back to the Senate for further review, two other clauses
were removed, but clause 5 (dealing with the changes to section 202.1(i))
remained intact.  Bill C-1332 came into effect on May 29, 2008, except for
certain provisions, which later came into force on October 1, 2008.33  There-
fore, since the changes to subsection 202.1(i) were not debated in the House of
Commons, the Senate’s comments about the non-extraterritorial reach of the
amendments is the only quasi-interpretative aid for us to rely upon in sug-
gesting that the amendment does not include transactions from organizations
outside of Canada.
C. The Deficiencies in Canada’s Strategies
Given the shaky legislative history of Bill C-13, this article argues that
Canada’s strategy is one that ignores the reality of online gaming because it is,
almost by definition, an extraterritorial activity.  Therefore, a legislative
scheme that prohibits non-government controlled online gaming sites in
Canada, but does not apply to foreign operated sites, does little to protect
Canadians themselves or the revenue lost offshore.  Indeed, sending sensitive
personal and financial information to distant, offshore gaming organizations –
which may be subject to few, if any, regulations and procedural safeguards – is
not in the public’s interest (or the revenue generating interests of the provinces,
for that matter).  In fact, this seems to be at odds with the main justification for
easing the restrictions on gambling (in general) and online gaming (in particu-
lar): revenue generation.  Provinces should consider a licensing scheme for for-
eign gaming operators wishing to have a legal customer base in Canada, similar
to what the U.K. has done.
III. THE U.K. APPROACH: REGULATE, LICENSE, AND TAX
In 2005, the U.K. created the Gambling Act,34, which came into force on
September 1, 2007, allowing the British Gambling Commission to regulate all
forms of gambling, including online gaming.35  The Gambling Act also pro-
vided for a system whereby the government could identify first tier jurisdic-
tions and add them to a so-called “white list.”36  Since only jurisdictions
themselves could qualify for the “white list,” the application could only be
made by foreign governments, not private organizations.  Moreover, the appli-
cant government had to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the U.K. government
that its legislative and regulatory controls were comparable to that of the U.K.37
In addition, the applicant government had to demonstrate that they had the
32 Bill C-13, S.C. 2008, c. 18 (Can.).
33 Order in Council, Bill C-13, S.C. 2008-1065 (June 6, 2008) (Can.).
34 Gambling Act, 2005, c. 19 (UK).
35 Tony Coles, The UK White List—Recent Developments, CANADIAN GAMING LAW. MAG.,
May 2008, at 19, 19.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 20.
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technical and administrative ability to enforce its own regime.38  Indeed, the
intent of the “white list” was to ensure that offshore gaming sites bore compa-
rable level(s) of responsibility as that of domestic sites.39
In 2009, concerns were raised by members of Parliament over whether the
current state of regulations provided adequate protection for British consumers,
in light of an increasing number of gaming operators being regulated offshore,
outside of British jurisdiction.40  On January 7, 2010, Sports Minister Gerry
Sutcliffe announced proposals to adopt new license requirements for overseas-
based online gaming companies that want to have a customer base in Britain.41
This would mean “that online operators currently licensed outside Britain
would have to apply for a license from the Gambling Commission if they want
to advertise or provide their gambling services to British consumers.”42  There-
fore, this new license requirement would ultimately replace or supplement the
white listed jurisdictions and would require each and every operator to obtain a
license.  The original intent of the “white list” system was to ensure that juris-
dictions were regulated at an adequate level to protect U.K. players; whereas
the government’s latest proposals (to apply the same standards to all operators
targeting the U.K. market) are intended to protect both U.K. players and help
U.K.-based business.43
In March 2010, the U.K. Department for Culture Media and Sport
(“DCMS”) released a consultation report stating that even though “British con-
sumers constituted a significant proportion of the European remote gambling
market, their domestic regulator, tasked with upholding the licensing objectives
of the act, was regulating increasingly fewer gambling operators.”44  In addi-
tion, following the implementation of the act, no major international gaming
operators have transferred their overseas operation to Britain.45  Attorneys John
Hagan and Melanie Ellis explained that this was primarily due to the tax rate of
15% on gambling profit.46  Hagan and Ellis argue that being able to market
their services to the U.K. without obtaining a local license and without paying
the local tax rate has meant overseas operators, particularly those based in low
or zero tax white listed jurisdictions, “have been having their cake and eating it
too.”47  The consultation report argued that:
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Dep’t for Culture Media & Sport, A Consultation on the Regulatory Future of Remote
Gambling in Great Britain, 2010, DCMS, at 12, available at http://www.culture.gov.uk/
images/consultations/remotegambling_consultation.pdf [hereinafter DCMS].
41 Department for Culture, Media And Sport: New British License Requirements for Over-
seas Online Gambling Firms, MYNEWSDESK (Jan. 7,2010), http://www.mynewsdesk.com/
uk/view/pressrelease/department-for-culture-media-and-sport-new-british-licence-require-
ments-for-overseas-online-gambling-firms-359653.
42 Id.
43 John Hagan & Melanie Ellis, New British License Requirements for Offshore Online
Gambling Operators: Reasons, Implications and Predictions, CANADIAN GAMING LAW.
MAG., May 2010, at 11, 12.
44 DCMS, supra note 40, at 13.
45 Id.
46 Hagan & Ellis, supra note 43, at 11.
47 Id at 11-12 (which, in all fairness, is precisely what one should do with cake).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\2-2\NVG201.txt unknown Seq: 7 10-JAN-12 16:03
Fall 2011] GTL: GAMING, TERRITORIALITY, AND THE LAW 161
[T]he commission is funded primarily through licensing fees paid by licensed gam-
bling operators; therefore, as overseas operators do not pay licensing fees to the com-
mission, any work undertaken to assess the social responsibility and age verification
procedures of overseas operators targeting the British market must either be met out
of fee income or separately funded by the DCMS.48
The consultation period was intended to run for twelve weeks from March
22, to June 18, 2010.49  However, according to a November 19, 2010 note on
online gambling, provided for members of Parliament by the U.K. House of
Commons Library, DCMS ministers have been analyzing these issues and rec-
ognizing plausible solutions since June 2010 as they hope to make an
announcement regarding the future of the U.K.’s regulation policies in due
course.50  For now at least, the “white list” is suspended, and all operators must
apply for a license in the U.K. if they wish to have a British customer base.51
Canada should learn from the U.K. experience.  Instead of creating a “white
list” of jurisdictions, Canadian provinces could require all offshore gaming
operators wishing to advertise or provide their gaming services to Canadian
consumers to apply for and obtain a license.
Nonetheless, the cost of becoming licensed in Canada and paying the asso-
ciated taxes may result in some less reputable operators choosing to disregard
the law and continue their activities in Canada regardless.  Furthermore, many
operators have found ways to get around advertising restrictions by offering
non-wagering versions of their gaming sites.52  Once on those non-wagering
versions, players can seamlessly sign up for the wagering version as their
familiarity and comfort grows.  In addition, it is unclear whether offshore oper-
ators will even consider Canada to be an “important enough” market to justify
paying taxes and licensing fees, especially if the market is further divided into
individual provinces.  Taxation is another issue: incentives or bilateral double
taxation agreements might further incentivize operators.
With that said, ignoring the fact that foreign online gaming sites are acces-
sible by Canadians is nothing more than willful blindness.  The dangers of
fraud53 and identity theft are real.  The U.K. strategy, at least, attempts to pro-
vide a mechanism whereby foreign operators can apply for a license.  This pro-
48 DCMS, supra note 40, at 19.
49 Id. at 4.
50 H. of Commons, Online Gambling, 2010, H.C. SN/HA/4041, at 15 (U.K.).
51 Jersey Politicians in Talks with UK, CASINO TIMES (June 27, 2011), http://www.casino
times.co.uk/casino/news/2011/6/talks-with-uk-27101052.html
“. . . Companies are currently unable to offer gaming opportunities after the UK barred access to
the list in 2009 – some time before the state’s legislation was in place. Politicians are now
hoping to lay their hands on a temporary licence whilst lawmakers re-evaluate the terms of
existing legislation. . . Assistant economic development minister for Jersey, Constable Len Nor-
man, echoed Whittingdale’s optimism and suggested that a resolution could arrive within a
period of months. “It is only recently our law has been approved”, he said. “We are now making
an application to the Minister in the UK to appear on that white list.” As millions continue to be
invested in the e-gaming industry, it’s clear that Jersey can look forward to ushering in a new era
in online gambling. Industry members will be watching with close interest as discussions get
underway.”
52 See, e.g., Party Poker FAQ - Online Poker Information, TIGHT POKER, http://www.tight
poker.com/partypoker (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
53 Crowne-Mohammed & Andreacchi, supra note 5, at 305-06.
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vides some sort of ‘notice’ to players that these sites have met certain minimum
standards and are notionally safe.  Likewise, Canada should offer a license to
operators willing to meet standards comparable to those of their own govern-
mental sites.  In addition, the revenue generated from such a scheme can be put
towards further research and enforcement of online gaming activities.  This is
one way the provinces can receive a share of the revenue generated by Cana-
dian gamblers that use foreign gaming sites.  Foreign operators that want to
advertise their sites and have a customer base in Canada would likely pay for a
seal of approval from a governmental agency (especially if the law required it).
By enticing foreign operators to become licensed, the provincial governments
can increase revenues and ensure that their citizens have access to safe and
responsible online gaming sites.
IV. THE U.S. APPROACH: PROHIBIT
Another approach to the apparent ‘scourge’ of offshore gaming sites is to
ban them outright.  This is the rash approach the United States adopted.  The
Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act54 (“UIGEA”), which formed
Title VII of the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006,55 was
passed the day before Congress was set to adjourn for the 2006 elections.56
Although the UIGEA completely bans Internet gaming activities, it is unique in
that the enforcement provisions target Internet gaming at the source of fund-
ing.57  In other words, the UIGEA relies on financial institutions from the
United States to block Internet gaming transactions.  There is a variety of
means of transacting business, including, but not limited to, paper checks,
credit transmissions, electronic fund transfers, money transmissions, and stored
value cards.58  Attorney Brant Leonard argues that this provision places the
burden on financial institutions and money transmitting businesses to monitor
transactions to identify and prevent those transactions related to Internet
gaming.59
However, prohibition has never worked in the United States.  Much like
the evil rumrunners during Prohibition, U.S. gamblers have found ways to con-
tinue their online gaming activities.60  Gamblers are now resorting to third
party payment processors that have popularized since credit card companies
have begun to restrict direct transfers to online casinos.61  In addition, critics of
the UIGEA point out citizens could always set up accounts in overseas banks,
where money can then be sent to any offshore online casino.62  The point
being: irrational and knee-jerk laws are never obeyed.
54 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367 (2006).
55 6 U.S.C. § 942 (2006).
56 I. Nelson Rose, Viewpoint: The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006
Analyzed, 10 GAMING L. REV. 537, 537 (2006).
57 Brant M. Leonard, Note, Highlighting the Drawbacks of the UIGEA: Proposed Rules
Reveal Heavy Burdens, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 515, 526 (2009).
58 Id. at 527.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 532.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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In addition to the loopholes identified above, the UIGEA places an unfair
burden on financial transaction providers.  The UIGEA allows the Federal
Reserve System “to create regulations requiring financial institutions to iden-
tify, block, or otherwise prevent restricted transactions through the establish-
ment of policies and procedures.”63  Furthermore, the estimated cost to the
financial sector for implementing these regulations is $88.5 million and the
annual cost of maintaining the procedures is $3.3 million.64  One of the biggest
complaints about the UIGEA is that the rules do not attempt to provide a more
precise definition of what gambling activities are actually prohibited by the
UIGEA.65  Attorney Chad Finkelstein explains that this vagary set off a
firestorm of complaints from the financial industry, which was uncertain of
what was expected of it.66  To address these concerns, certain exemptions were
crafted for the financial institutions (which again created loopholes that could
easily be exploited).67
For instance, the proposed rules suggest that the two types of payment
systems that have the benefit of merchant coding (i.e. credit card and money
transmitting systems) must monitor extended transactions.68  While on the
other hand, “all participants in the automatic clearing house, check clearing,
and wire transfer systems are exempt from the regulations, unless they have a
customer relationship with an Internet gambling business.”69  These exemp-
tions are designed to ease the burden on the financial industry, especially with
respect to paper checks, where the financial industry processes billions of
checks each year, but does not have the requisite mechanisms in place to deter-
mine to whom a paper check is made.70  Without this, the cost to monitor paper
checks alone would have run into the billions.71
Therefore, the exception for paper checks will render the UIGEA ineffec-
tive given that “even if the UIGEA could block restricted transactions through
all other methods, Internet gambling companies could simply use paper checks
to avoid detection.”72  Internet gambling company, PokerStars.com, already
sends invoices to U.S. customers via checks out of a realization that although
this method is slower compared to credit and debit card transactions, it provides
them continued access to lucrative markets.73  As such, the UIGEA seems to be
“ultimately unsuccessful because it places a multi-million dollar burden on the
financial industry, in the midst of a financial crisis, in order to implement a
63 Ross A. Crutchfield, Comment, Folding A Losing Hand: Why Congress Should Replace
the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act with A Regulatory Scheme, 45 TULSA L.
REV. 161, 164-65 (2009).
64 Id. at 166.
65 Id. at 165.
66 Chad Finkelstein, Don’t Bank on It: The Liability of Financial Services Providers in
Canada, CANADIAN GAMING LAW. MAG., May 2010 at 18, 19, available at http://www.
gaminglawmasters.com/magazines/Canadian/CGL_May_2010.pdf.
67 Discussed infra notes 68, 69.
68 Leonard, supra note 57, at 538.
69 Crutchfield, supra note 63, at 166.
70 Id.
71 Leonard, supra note 57, at 539.
72 Crutchfield, supra note 63, at 177.
73 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\2-2\NVG201.txt unknown Seq: 10 10-JAN-12 16:03
164 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:155
scheme that will be unable to stop transactions between Internet gambling com-
panies and U.S. players.”74
In addition to issues surrounding the enforceability of the UIGEA, the
United States was also involved in a World Trade Organization (“WTO”) dis-
pute with Antigua over the Act’s operation.  Antigua filed a claim against the
United States with the WTO in March 2003, and alleged that the United States’
federal and state laws constituted a violation of the General Agreement on
Trade and Services (“GATS”) to liberalize trade in services for the gambling
and betting services sector.75  In 2004, the WTO agreed with Antigua that the
United States had indeed violated the GATS agreement.76  The GATS prohibits
the United States “from discriminating against foreign businesses by allowing
them to provide services to U.S. citizens that are also provided by domestic
companies.”77  The United States appealed the decision, but the WTO panel
again sided with Antigua in March 2007, holding that the UIGEA violated the
United States’ obligation under the GATS provisions requiring open market
access.78  Ever defiant though, the UIGEA remains in effect.
The U.S. strategy seeks to curtail offshore gaming by cutting off its finan-
cial legs.  This strategy could easily be applied in Canada and has already
caught the attention of Canadian politicians.  On February 6, 2008, while
addressing the House of Commons regarding Bill C-13, Roy Cullen suggested
looking at a private member’s bill that called on banks to, basically, intercept
transactions when their credit cards or debit cards are being used for illegal
activities.79  Cullen explicitly mentioned that this plan was already being fol-
lowed in the United States.80  However, given the considerable drawbacks,
impracticality, and trade sanctions that could arise, it is not suggested that
Canada implement an outright ban.
V. CONCLUSION
As it currently stands, only the provincial governments can operate online
gaming sites in Canada.81  But if the U.K. and U.S. situations demonstrate any-
thing, it is the borderless nature of online gaming.  Relying on gaming sites to
regulate themselves is, perhaps, not in the best interest of Canadians.  However,
74 Id.
75 Request for Consultations by Antigua and Barbuda, United Sates – Measures Affecting
the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS2851/1 (Mar. 27, 2003),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm.
76 Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling
and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R/271 (Nov. 10, 2004), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm.
77 Leonard, supra note 58, at 535.
78 Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling
and Betting Services, WT/DS285/RW/41 (Mar. 30, 2007), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm.
79 142 H. of Commons Deb. 2653, 2684 (Feb. 6, 2008) (statement of Sen. Cullen).
80 Id.
81 For a notable curiosity see Crowne-Mohammed & Roy, supra note 14, at 8 (discussing
the Kahnawake Gaming Commission – a gambling commission created by the Kahnawake
First Nation’s people, an indigenous group in Quebec, Canada – which the authors have
labeled as “clearly illegal”).
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advocates of self-regulation argue that it is the most effective way of regulating
online gaming because:
1) Regulations enacted by individual countries have not kept pace with new technol-
ogies and attitudes;
2) Even when a sovereign promulgates modern regulations, issues of enforcement
and jurisdiction remain;
3) Zealous enforcement campaigns by individual nations are only effective against
responsible and respectable establishments; and
4) Self-regulation would allow the reputable companies to succeed and disreputable
companies to fail through market forces and watch dog websites.82
According to these advocates, the fierce competitive nature of the Internet
gaming industry remedies the situation where a foreign company provides inad-
equate protections against fraud because the ‘market’ will ensure that they do
not remain in business for too long.83  Internet gaming “watchdog” sites are
quick to gain information about such disreputable companies and disseminate it
widely.84  Indeed, the global nature of the Internet almost precludes regulation
by any one sovereign state.85
Another feature of self-regulation is the creation of a governing body,
which could act as a forum for dispute resolution and set ethical and technical
guidelines.86  This body could in turn be validated by various governments
throughout the world as satisfying certain minimum regulatory requirements
(for a fee, of course).87  For instance, Wiebe and Lipton indicate, “50 Internet
companies adhere to eCOGRA (eCommerce Online Gaming and Assurance),
the independent standards authority of the online gaming industry, and have
established a minimum standards for consumer protection, fair gaming, and
responsible conduct.”88  eCOGRA is a non-profit organization that specifically
oversees fair gaming, player protection, and responsible operator conduct (like
prompt payments, safe storage of information, randomness of games, and hon-
est advertising).89
However, self-regulation relies on goodwill and consensus.  Organizations
like eCOGRA are limited in terms of their reach, effectiveness, and enforce-
ment.90  Additionally, disreputable sites can easily shutdown and re-open under
a different name – with the ‘market’ being none the wiser.  Furthering the argu-
ment that provincial governments should aim to protect Canadians by regulat-
ing their exposure to such sites (as utopian dreams that offshore operators will
regulate themselves in a manner that is somehow aligned with the “public’s
interest”) is just that: a utopian dream.
82 Crutchfield, supra note 63, at 171-72.
83 Id. at 173.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 172.
86 Id. at 173.
87 Id.
88 Jamie Wiebe, PH.D. & Michael Lipton, Internet Gambling Regulations, CANADIAN GAM-
ING LAW. MAG., May 2009 at 17, 18, available at http://www.gaminglawmasters.com/
magazines/Canadian%2009%20May.pdf.
89 Id.
90 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\2-2\NVG201.txt unknown Seq: 12 10-JAN-12 16:03
166 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:155
Ontario, British Columbia, and the Atlantic provinces have, or will, create
online gambling sites.91  Canadian provinces must figure out exactly how they
are going to deal with foreign operated online gambling sites.  Following the
U.K. strategy of regulating online gaming operators in exchange for the lucra-
tive ability to lawfully advertise in Canada (and gain a Canadian client base)
may actually be beneficial for the provinces.  However, if each province contin-
ues to control the organizations allowed to conduct gaming within their juris-
diction, the seamlessness of the approval process becomes fractured across
Canada.  A national regulator – either at the federal level or by consensus of the
provinces – is needed.  Given the history and evolution of gambling laws in
Canada, it is unlikely that a federal level regulator would be created; therefore,
it is strongly suggested that provinces collectively participate in creating a
national regulator (whereby each province has a designated representative,
along with community members and experts).  This regulator could set out a
national, comprehensive regulatory strategy that would include elements of the
U.K. style of regulation, along with the necessary participation of experts and
members of the public.
91 OLG to Launch Internet Gaming, supra note 1.
